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Abstract 
Previous experiments have explored the effects of gender and cognitive reflection on dishonesty 
separately. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have investigated potential interactions 
between these two factors. Exploring this interaction is important because previous work found that 
males tend to be both more deliberative than females. Therefore, it is possible that the gender effect 
on dishonesty is moderated by cognitive reflection. Here we report a large online experiment (N = 
766) where subjects first have a chance to lie for their benefit and then take a Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT). We find a significant interaction between gender and CRT score such that lack of 
deliberation promotes honesty for men but not for women. Additional analyses highlight that this 
effect is mainly driven by men whose answers in the CRT are neither intuitive nor deliberative, who 
happen to be particularly honest in our deception game.    
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Introduction 
 Dishonesty has a negative impact on people, companies, and the society as a whole. 
For example, according to a 2001 study by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the “tax gap” 
between tax owed and tax paid, which results mostly from tax evasion, is between $312 billion and 
$353 billion annually, which corresponds to a noncompliance rate between 15% and 16.6% 
(Herman 2005).  
Understanding which factors influence dishonesty has therefore inspired a great deal 
of work (Gneezy, 2005; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2014). Among 
the most studied factors, there are gender and cognitive reflection.  
 The effect of gender on dishonesty  
Dreber & Johannesson (2008) found that men lie more than women in the context of 
self-serving lies (also called black lies). This result was replicated by Friesen and Gangadharan 
(2012), while, instead, Childs (2012) found no gender differences. Erat & Gneezy (2012) observed 
that the consequences of lying matter: women are more likely than men to tell altruistic white lies 
(lies that benefit another person at a cost for the liar), but men are more likely than women to tell 
Pareto white lies (lies that benefit all parties involved). However, the latter result was not replicated 
by Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodded (2013). Biziou-van-Pol, Haenen, Novaro, Occhipinti-
Liberman and Capraro (2015) also found no gender differences in the domain of Pareto white lies; 
additionally, in contrast to Erat & Gneezy (2012), they found that men are more likely than women 
to tell altruistic white lies. Given this mixed evidence, researchers have recently turned to meta-
analytic techniques: Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (in press) analyzed the decisions of over 32,000 
subjects and found that men lie more than women, but they did not control for the consequences of 
lying; Capraro (2018) analyzed the decisions over 8,000 subjects and found that men tell more 
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black lies and more altruistic white lies than women, while results are inconclusive in the case of 
Pareto white lies.  
The effect of cognitive reflection on dishonesty 
 A handful of papers explored the effect of cognitive reflection, measured through the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), on dishonesty, finding mixed results. Gino and Ariely (2012) 
found CRT not to be correlated to honesty. However, Fosgaard et al (2013) found CRT to be 
positively associated with cheating. Interestingly, Ruffle and Toble (2016) found the opposite, that 
high CRT predicts honesty. This mixed literature is mirrored also in studies manipulating cognitive 
reflection mode. Some studies found that time delay (as a proxy for reflective thinking, Rand, 
Greene & Nowak, 2012; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015; Merkel & Lohse, 2018) promotes dishonesty 
(Capraro, 2017; Capraro, Schulz & Rand, 2018; Lohse, Simon & Konrad, 2018), while others 
suggested it promotes honesty (Gunia et al, 2012; Shalvi et al, 2012), and yet another one reported 
no effect (Barcelo & Capraro, 2017). Also studies using conceptual priming of intuition, cognitive 
load, or ego-depletion found mixed results (Cappelen, Sørensen & Tungodded, 2013; Vershuere et 
al, 2018; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011; van’t Veer, Stel & van Beest, 2014). 
 Theoretical motivation for studying how gender and cognitive reflection interact in 
the context of honest behavior 
As mentioned earlier, previous works have investigated the effect of gender and 
cognitive reflection on honesty, but they did so separately. This is an important limitation because a 
line of recent research suggests that men tend to score higher than women in the CRT (Brañas-
Garza, Kujal & Lenkei, 2015; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva et al, 2016; Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2016; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Ring, Neyse, David-Barett & Schmidt, 2016; 
Albaity, Rahman & Shahidul, 2014; Toplak et al, 2014; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati & 
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Hamilton, 2016). This raises an important question: Is the effect of cognitive reflection on honesty 
moderated by gender?  
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have explored this question in the domain of 
honest behavior. Somewhat related, previous research has investigated the interaction between 
gender and experimental manipulation of cognitive processing in behavioral domains such as 
altruism and cooperation: Rand et al (2016) found, in a meta-analysis of 22 dictator game 
experiments, that promoting intuition versus deliberation favors altruism for women but not for 
men; whereas Rand (2017) found, in a meta-analysis of 67 studies, that promoting intuition versus 
deliberation favors cooperation for men and women alike.  
Given this gap in the literature, here we aim at doing a first step in the direction of 
exploring the interaction between gender and cognitive reflection in the domain of honest behavior. 
Method 
Measure of cognitive reflection 
To measure participants’ cognitive reflection trait, we use the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT). First developed by Frederick (2005), the CRT includes three questions characterized by 
the property that an automatic, intuitive answer typically pops up to people’s mind. However, this 
answer is wrong and, in order to find the right answer, people have to overcome this automatic 
reaction. For example: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total; if the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball, 
how much does the ball cost? The intuitive answer is $0.10. A moment of reflection, however, 
rejects this answer: if the ball costs $0.10 and the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball, then the bat 
costs $1.10; thus, the bat and the ball together cost $1.20, and not $1.10 as assumed. The actual cost 
of the ball is indeed $0.05. The CRT score (number of correct answers in the CRT) has been shown 
to correlate with analytic cognitive style, measured using the Need for Cognition scale (Pennycook, 
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Cheyne, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2016). Thus, we take this number, the CRT score, as a measure of 
cognitive reflection.    
Measure of honesty 
 To measure participants’ honesty, we use a variant of Gneezy’s (2005) Deception 
game that has been formulated by Biziou-van-Pol et al (2015). In this variant, subjects are each 
matched with an anonymous receiver and are informed that they have been randomly assigned to 
either Group 1 or Group 2, and that they will be asked to declare which group they have been 
assigned to. They can choose between: “I have been assigned to Group 1” or “I have been assigned 
to Group 2”. If they report the true number, they will get $0.4 while the receiver gets $0.5; instead, 
if they report the other number, they will receive $0.5, while the receiver gets $0.4. Subjects are 
informed that the receiver will not be informed about their true group number, and about the 
payoffs corresponding to the available choices. Two comprehension questions, one regarding the 
choice maximizing their payoff and one regarding the choice maximizing the receiver’s payoff, are 
asked before making a decision. Subjects failing either or both comprehension questions are 
automatically excluded from the survey. Thus, subjects play the game having a full understanding 
of its rules. 
 We chose this variant of the deception game to avoid having subjects that use 
sophisticated deception: telling the truth because they believe that the receiver will not believe them 
(Sutter, 2009). In our case, the receiver does not make any choice, and thus beliefs about the beliefs 
of the receiver do not play any role.  
 We chose this particular payoff structure, instead of more classical ones in which both 
players get the same payoffs when the sender tells the truth (e.g., Biziou-van-Pol et al, 2015; 
Cappelen et al, 2013; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005), because previous research shows that 
low CRT is associated with more egalitarian choices (Capraro et al, 2017). This could have been a 
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source of confound in case honesty had brought the same payoff to both players, such that we 
would have not been able to conclude that any effect of CRT on honesty would be driven by lying 
aversion: it could be driven by the payoff consequences of the available actions. Additionally, 
Capraro et al (2017) also show that high CRT is associated with socially efficient choices. This is 
why we opted for a payoff structure such that the sum of the payoffs of the two players and their 
absolute difference is constant across choices. Finally, Capraro et al (2017) also find that low CRT 
is associated with spitefulness, while high CRT is associated with payoff maximization. This does 
not create any confound in our setting, because the spiteful choice coincides with the payoff 
maximizing choice. 
 Data collection and procedure 
  We recruited subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) (Arechar, Gächter & 
Molleman, 2018; Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018; Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 
2013; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand, Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014). Subjects were living in the US at the time of the experiment and earned $0.50 for completing 
the survey, plus an additional bonus depending on the choice made in the Deception game.  
 Subjects first participated in the Deception game, then took the CRT, and finally 
completed a demographic questionnaire, at the end of which they received a completion code, 
through which they could submit the survey on AMT and claim for their payment. All subjects 
made a decision in the Deception game. After the survey was completed, we randomly created pairs 
of subject, and, each subject, was paid two bonuses, one as a chooser and one as a receiver (when 
making their choice, participants were not informed that they will receive a payoff also as a receiver 
to avoid having this impact their decision). Experimental instructions are reported in the appendix.  
Results 
 Participants and variables  
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A total of 766 participants passed the comprehension questions and participated in the experiment. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all the variables in our study. Female is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the participant reports that she is a female. Age is self-explanatory. Education 
takes value 1 if the participant reports that their higher highest level of education completed is “less 
than high school diploma”; Education = 2 corresponds to “high school diploma”; Education = 3 
corresponds to “vocational training”; Education = 4 corresponds to “attended college”; Education = 
5 corresponds to “bachelor’s degree”; Education = 6 corresponds to “graduate degree”; Education = 
7 corresponds to “unknown” (no participants have actually reported Education = 7). Honesty takes 
value 1 if the subject told the truth in our deception game. CRT counts the number of correct 
answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test. CRT_intuitive counts the number of intuitive answers in 
the Cognitive Reflection Test. CRT_residual counts the number of answers in the Cognitive 
Reflection Test that are neither intuitive nor deliberative.  
 mean median std min max 
female 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
age 37.4 34 11.44 18 82 
education 4.42 5 1.17 1 6 
honesty 0.30 0 0.46 0 1 
CRT 1.58 2 1.22 0 3 
CRT-intuitive 2.15 3 1.13 0 3 
CRT-residual 0.19 0 0.46 0 3 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 Main effect of gender on honesty 
We start by looking at the main effect of gender on honesty. Average honesty among males was 
0.31, while average honesty among females was 0.28. The difference is not statistically significant 
(logit regression predicting Honesty as a function of Female, p = 0.386). This result is robust for 
controlling on age and education (p=0.330). In sum, we find no gender differences in deception in 
our task.  
 Main effect of cognitive reflection on honesty 
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Next, we look at the main effect of cognitive reflection on honesty. Logistic regression predicting 
Honesty as a function of CRT finds no statistically significant effect (p=0.187). When including 
control on female, age, and education, we find a marginally significant negative effect of CRT on 
Honesty (coeff = -0.121, z = -1.77, p = 0.076). Similar results hold if we replace CRT with CRT-
intuitive, however, this time, the effect of CRT-intuitive on honesty is not statistically significant 
both when we do not include control on female, age, education (p=0.232) and when we include 
control (p=0.104). Thus, in our sample, we find very little evidence of a main effect of cognitive 
reflection on honesty.  
 Main effect of gender on cognitive reflection 
Now, we look at the main effect of gender on cognitive reflection. Linear regression predicting CRT 
as a function of Female finds a highly significant negative effect (coeff = -0.564, t = -6.57, p < 
.001). This result is robust after controlling for age and education (coeff = -0.589, t = -6.91, p < 
.001). Thus, in our sample, females tend to score lower than males in the cognitive reflection test. 
The interaction between Cognitive Reflection and Gender 
 Coming to our main research question, we now conduct logit regression predicting Honesty as a 
function of the following variables: Female, CRT, and their interaction Female X CRT. Results are 
reported in Table 2 (column (I) with no control on Age and Education, column (II) with control).  
We find that both female and CRT have a negative effect on Honesty (Female: coeff = -0.675, z = -
2.58, p =0.010; CRT: coeff = -0.265, z = -2.76, p = 0.006). Interestingly, also the interaction Female 
X CRT is significant (coeff = 0.310, z = 2.33, p = 0.020). These results are robust after controlling 
for age and education (see Table 1, Column (II)).  
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 Honesty 
 (I) (II) 
Female -0.675** (0.262) -0.714*** (0.264) 
CRT -0.265*** (0.096) -0.284*** (0.112) 
Female X CRT 0.310** (0.133) 0.314** (0.158) 
Age  0.009 (0.007) 
Education  0.049 (0.069) 
Constant -0.311 (0.202) -0.827* (0.433) 
Observations 766 766 
Table 2. Logit regressions predicting honesty as a function of the highlighted variables. *: p < 
0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. 
The significant interaction between Female and CRT suggests that CRT affects 
Honesty differently for males and females. To better understand this effect, we conduct logit 
regression predicting Honesty as a function of CRT for males and females separately. We find that 
CRT has a significant negative impact on Honesty among males (coeff = -0.265, z = -2.76, p = 
0.006) but not females (coeff = 0.045, z = 0.48, p = 0.628). This result is clear also from Figure 1, 
where, to increase readability, we divide subjects into “high deliberation” (CRT = 2 or 3) and “low 
deliberation” (CRT = 0 or 1). 
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Figure 1. CRT has a negative effect on Honesty among males but not females.  
In order to have a better understanding of this effect, we explore the impact of the co-
variable CRT-intuitive, which counts the number of intuitive responses in the CRT, on honesty. We 
specify since now that this variable does not represent a reliable measure of intuitive cognitive style, 
at least when measured using the Faith in Intuition scale (Pennycook et al, 2016). With this in mind, 
this analysis will however allow us to have a better understanding of the aforementioned interaction 
between CRT and gender. We conduct logit regression predicting Honesty as a function of Female, 
CRT-intuitive, and the interaction Female X CRT-intuitive. Results are reported in Table 2. 
Interestingly, while we still find a significant effect of CRT-intuitive on honesty, this time the 
interaction Female X CRT-intuitive is not significant.  
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 Honesty 
 (I) (II) 
Female 0.051 (0.236) 0.024 (0.237) 
CRT-intuitive 0.201** (0.100) 0.219** (0.101) 
Female x CRT-intuitive -0.192 (0.137) -0.195 (0.138) 
Age  0.009 (0.007) 
Education  0.049 (0.069) 
Constant -0.991*** (0.153) -1.542*** (0.447) 
Observations 766 766 
Table 3. Logit regressions predicting honesty as a function of the highlighted variables. *: p < 
0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. 
This analysis suggests that the aforementioned negative effect of CRT on honesty for 
men but not for women is driven by men who give answers in the CRT that are neither deliberative 
nor intuitive, who happen to be honest in the deception game. To strengthen this interpretation, we 
define a variable CRT-residual (we adopt the terminology from Cueva et al, 2016) which counts the 
answers in the CRT that are neither deliberative, nor intuitive, and we analyze whether this variable 
impacts the level of honesty while interacting with gender. Logit regression predicting Honesty as a 
function of Female, CRT-residual, and the interaction Female X CRT-residual shows a significant 
interaction (coeff = -0.917, z = -2.57, p = 0.010), such that providing neither intuitive nor 
deliberative answers in the CRT predicts honesty for males (coeff = 0.532, z = 2.22, p = 0.027) but 
not for females (coeff = -0.384, z = -1.46, p = 0.145). Moreover, logit regression predicting Honesty 
as a function of Female, CRT, and their interaction, gives a non-significant interaction effect when 
restricted to the set of subjects such that CRT-residual=0 (p=0.124). Figure 2 represents these 
results, by reporting honesty as a function of whether subjects gave at least one answer in the CRT 
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that was neither intuitive nor deliberative. (We opted for this representation of these results, because 
only 20 subjects have CRT-residual = 2 or CRT-residual = 3).  
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that lack of deliberation favors honesty for 
men but not for women, and that this effect is mainly driven by men who give answers that are 
neither intuitive nor deliberative. 
 
Figure 2. Providing at least one answer in the CRT that is neither intuitive nor deliberative 
(Residual > 0) predicts honesty for males but not for females. 
General discussion 
Understanding the effect of gender and cognitive reflection on honesty is a current 
topic of debate. However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have explored the interaction 
between these two factors. Investigating this interaction is important because previous works have 
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found that men score higher than women in the Cognitive Reflection Test, a fact that raises the 
question: Is the effect of cognitive reflection on honesty moderated by gender?  
Given this gap in the literature, we have conducted a large (N=766) study exploring 
how gender and cognitive reflection interact in determining people’s behavior in a deception game, 
using a large (N=766) sample of American subjects recruited online on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
We found a significant interaction, such that lack of deliberation predicts honesty among men but 
not among women. Additional analyses showed that this effect is driven by men whose answers in 
the cognitive reflection test are neither intuitive nor deliberative.  
Our results add to the growing body of literature on the effect of gender and cognitive 
reflection on honesty. Previous work found mixed results regarding the role of cognitive reflection 
on truth-telling: Fosgaard et al (2013) found a positive effect; Gino & Ariely (2012) found a null 
effect; Ruffle & Toble (2016) found a negative effect. We add to this line of research by showing 
that, at least in our context, low CRT is associated with honesty, but only among males. Why only 
among males? This is an important question, about which, at this stage of the research, we can only 
speculate. One thing to note, first of all, is that all our subjects have passed comprehension 
questions about the deception game: thus we can exclude the trivial explanation that males are more 
likely than females to get confused by the deception game (and by the CRT) – a hypothesis that, in 
principle, could have explained our results. Another explanation that we can exclude is that males 
are less deliberative than females and that lack of deliberation favors honesty in this task: in line 
with previous research and in contrast with this hypothesis, we find that females score significantly 
lower than males in our CRT. One possible explanation, instead, is that some males are more 
careless than females: although they understand the general rules of the game and pass the 
comprehension questions (which guarantee them the basic payment), they lose interest and, when 
they are asked to report the group they are assigned to, they tell the true group number not because 
they want to be honest, but just because it is easy; and, when they take the CRT, they are more 
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likely to make “total mistakes” and give answers that are neither deliberative nor intuitive. We hope 
that further research might help clarify this point. In this light, also theoretical studies making 
predictions about when and why we should expect an interaction between gender and cognitive 
reflection will be of great help.   
Regarding the main effects of gender and cognitive reflection on honesty, we found 
non-statistically significant results in both cases. Whether there is a main effect of gender on 
honesty has long been debated, from the early work by Dreber and Johannesson (2008), which 
found that males tell more self-serving lies than females. Since then, several studies have explored 
this question, by reporting mixed results (Biziou-van-Pol et al, 2015; Cappelen et al, 2013; Childs, 
2012; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Friesen & Gangaradhan, 2012). To shed light on this mixed evidence, 
researchers have recently turn to meta-analytic techniques: two independent meta-analyses have 
both found that males are more dishonest than males (Abeler et al, in press; Capraro, 2018), at least 
in the case of self-serving lies and altruistic white lies (i.e., lies that help another person to a cost for 
the liar). We add to this literature by showing that, at least in our context, there are no gender 
differences in deception. As for the main effect of cognitive reflection, to the best of our 
knowledge, only three empirical studies analyzed the correlation between cognitive reflection and 
honesty before us, and found mixed results: Fosgaard et al (2013) found a positive effect; Gino & 
Ariely (2012) found a null effect; Ruffle & Toble (2016) found a negative effect. We add to this 
line of research by showing that, at least in our context, there is no main effect of cognitive 
reflection on honesty.  
Our results add also to the growing body of literature regarding gender differences in 
cognitive reflection. In line with previous literature (Brañas-Garza, Kujal & Lenkei, 2015; 
Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva et al, 2016; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2016; 
Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Ring, Neyse, David-Barett & Schmidt, 2016; Albaity, Rahman & 
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Shahidul, 2014; Toplak et al, 2014; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati & Hamilton, 2016), also we 
found that females score less than males in the CRT.   
Another important feature of our work is that we used a large (N=766) sample of 
subjects that are more representative than the classical student sample that is used in standard 
laboratory experiments. Indeed, although it is known that American MTurkers are still less 
representative than the general population (e.g., Asians are overrepresented and Blacks and 
Hispanics are underrepresented), it is also known that they are more representative than student 
samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Shapiro et al., 2013). 
As every experimental work, also this one has some limitations. First of all, it explores 
the interaction between gender and cognitive reflection only in the case of black lies. It is possible 
that this effect changes when using lies with positive consequences for the receiver (altruistic white 
lies) or for both players (Pareto white lies), the rational being that people with high CRT might be 
more likely to be affected by the consequences of lying than people with low CRT, who might be 
more likely to follow heuristics and general rules of behavior that are independent of the specific 
context at hand (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). Another limitation is that we look only at the 
cognitive reflection trait and not at the cognitive reflection state. For example, exploring whether 
gender and time pressure/delay interact in case of honesty is a fascinating direction for future 
research that is not covered by this work. Another potential limitation of this work is that we cannot 
be completely sure that our results are driven by gender differences in the interaction between lying 
aversion and cognitive reflection. Another possible explanation is that low cognitive reflection 
makes males but not females simply more likely to prefer the economic allocation ($0.50, $0.40) 
over the economic allocation ($0.40, $0.50). Although we cannot exclude this alternative 
interpretation for sure, we note that, as we have discussed in the Methods section, we have designed 
our experiment in such a way to minimize the effect of this potential confound: previous research 
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found no evidence that low cognitive reflection makes men but not women more self-regarding or 
more spiteful (See Table 3 and Table 4 in the Supplementary Information of Capraro et al, 2017). 
In sum, our results demonstrate that low cognitive reflection predicts honesty for men 
but not for women. This effect is driven by men that make choices in the Cognitive Reflection Test 
that are neither intuitive nor deliberative.  
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Appendix 
Experimental instructions of the deception game 
Please read these instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on 
the decisions you make. 
  
You have been matched with another participant.  Your bonus and that of the other participant 
depends only on your choice. The other participant does not play any active role. 
  
There are two groups (group 1, group 2). You will be randomly assigned to one of them. You will 
be informed of the group you have been assigned to, but the other participant will not.  
  
We will ask you to declare the group you have been assigned to. So you get to choose between two 
possible options: 
  
Option 1: “I have been assigned to group 1.”  
Option 2: “I have been assigned to group 2.”  
  
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned 
to, then you will receive 40c and the other participant will receive 50c. 
 
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been 
assigned to), then you will receive 50c and the other participant will receive 40c. 
  
Finally, only you will be informed of the particular monetary value connected to each message. The 
other participant will not be informed of these monetary values. 
 
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that you have to 
answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If you fail any of them, 
the survey will automatically end and you will not get any payment. 
 
 
What is the choice that maximises YOUR outcome? 
(Available choices: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you 
have been assigned to/ Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the 
one you have not been assigned to)) 
 
What is the choice that maximises the OTHER PARTICIPANT'S outcome? 
(Available choices: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you 
have been assigned to/ Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the 
one you have not been assigned to)) 
 
Congratulations, you have passed all comprehension questions. It is now time to make your choice. 
You have been assigned to group 1 (group 2, random allocation).  
 
23 | P a g e  
 
Which option do you choose? 
(Available choices: "I have been assigned to group 1"/"I have been assigned to group 2") 
Experimental instructions of the CRT 
Please answer the following questions 
 
A jar of Peanut Butter and a jar of Jam cost $10.20 in total. The jar of Peanut Butter costs $10.00 
more than the jar of Jam. How much does the jar of Jam cost? _____ cents 
(choice to be typed in a blank text box) 
If it takes 6 machines 6 minutes to make 6 widgets, how long would it take 120 machines to make 
120 widgets? _____ minutes 
(choice to be typed in a blank text box) 
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 50 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ 
days 
(choice to be typed in a blank text box) 
 
